THIS PATCH IS BROKEN!

HERE FOR HISTORICAL PURPOSES _ONLY_!

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#                                                                              #
# Original patch by Ricardo Cerqueira <rmcc@clix.pt>                           #
#                                                                              #
# Updated by James Dennis <james@firstaidmusic.com> for openssh-3.7.1p2        #
#                                                                              #
# A patch to cause sshd to chroot when it encounters the magic token           #
# '/./' in a users home directory. The directory portion before the            #
# token is the directory to chroot() to, the portion after the                 #
# token is the user's home directory relative to the new root.                 #
#                                                                              #
# Patch source using: patch -p0 < /path/to/patch                               #
#                                                                              #
# Systems with a bad diff (doesn't understand -u or -N) should use gnu diff.   #
# Solaris may store this as gdiff under /opt/sfw/bin. I can't say much about   #
# other systems (unless you email me your experiences!).                       #
#                                                                              #
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diff -uNr ./openssh-3.8p1/session.c openssh-3.8p1-chroot/session.c
--- ./openssh-3.8p1/session.c	Mon Feb 23 08:01:27 2004
+++ openssh-3.8p1-chroot/session.c	Tue Mar  2 03:58:41 2004
@@ -58,6 +58,8 @@
 #include "session.h"
 #include "monitor_wrap.h"
 
+#define CHROOT
+
 #if defined(KRB5) && defined(USE_AFS)
 #include <kafs.h>
 #endif
@@ -1227,6 +1229,12 @@
 void
 do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
 {
+
+#ifdef CHROOT
+	char *user_dir;
+	char *new_root;
+#endif /* CHROOT */
+
 #ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
 	if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0)
 #endif /* HAVE_CYGWIN */
@@ -1270,6 +1278,27 @@
 			exit(1);
 		}
 		endgrent();
+
+#ifdef CHROOT
+	user_dir = xstrdup(pw->pw_dir);
+	new_root = user_dir  1;
+
+	while((new_root = strchr(new_root, '.')) != NULL) {
+		new_root--;
+		if(strncmp(new_root, "/./", 3) == 0) {
+			*new_root = '\0';
+			new_root = 2;
+
+			if(chroot(user_dir) != 0)
+				fatal("Couldn't chroot to user directory % s", user_dir);
+			pw->pw_dir = new_root;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		new_root = 2;
+	}
+#endif /* CHROOT */
+
 # ifdef USE_PAM
 		/*
 		 * PAM credentials may take the form of supplementary groups.